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BOOK NOTICES.

THEISM; Being the Baird Lecture for 1876. By ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D.
Published by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. For sale by Charles Scribner's Sons. Price, \$3.75.

The high position of the author, and his reputation as a philosophical writer, make the title of this volume a promise of something valuable. In many respects the promise is fulfilled. The spirit of the book, abating only a little petulance, not more than a sentence or so in length, is admirable. It would be difficult to find a fairer statement of the problem in all its issues, and of the temper which its treatment demands, than is presented in the first three lectures. It is a problem for reason, and reason is competent to solve it. Theologies of intuition and of feeling are shown to be subterfuges of an arbitrary faith, which is only another name for unconscious scepticism. True theology is a science, and the crown of sciences, — the science of supreme truth, to which all other truths lead up, and in which they find their unity, as the absolute Reason, whose thoughts are creations, and forever complete their processes in images of its own personality. Theology, therefore, is a progressive science, and moves with the step of all knowledge. Every discovery in the natural, or social, or metaphysical world has a distinct nerve of relations communicating with the central and omnipresent Reason of the Universe. Says Prof. Flint — and he is one of the strictest sect of Scotch orthodoxy: "I have, indeed, heard men say — I have heard even teachers of theology say, — that the knowledge of God is unlike all other knowledge, in being unchanging and unprogressive. To me it seems that, of all knowledge, the knowledge of God is, or at least ought to be, the most progressive. And that, for this simple reason, every increase of other knowledge — be it the knowledge of outward nature, or of the human soul, or of history — be it the knowledge of truth, or beauty, or goodness — ought also to increase the knowledge of Him. If it do not, it has not been used aright; and the reason why it has not been used so must be that we have looked upon God as if He were only one among many things, instead of looking upon Him as the One Being of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things." With such an estimate of the task he has set for himself, and after so fine a clearing away of embarrassing rubbish, it surprises us that Prof. Flint has not succeeded better. He seems to know what ought to be done, but not how to do it. He would prove the existence and perfection of God, but adopts a method which can never attain to proof. His arguments may confirm the faith of those who already believe, and who would still keep the comfort of believing; but they can never convince a sceptic, who may, and indeed does, use the same method just as logically to defend his scepticism. He looks for evidence in categories that cheat the mind to an endless chase, and leave it spent, in the despair of truth. It is only by a leap out of the category itself, which he still pretends to follow, that he reaches the desired conclusion. In the argument of causality, for instance, he accepts the rule that every thing which happens must have a cause; and since every such cause turns out to be an effect, and the chain would thus run on and on, and never get any nearer a beginning, there *must* be a first cause who is not caused. But why *must* it be? and how is that which *must* be, demonstrated to exist, and to exist in harmony with its own seeming contradictions? This "*must* be" is a sudden flight of need, when the proposal, at the outset, was to foot the

entire distance of proof. Hence the materialist complains, with good reason, that the arguer for a *first* cause violates the terms of evidence. He says: "I have learned not to jump. Science trains me to touch heel to toe, and cover every inch of ground, in my inferences. The most precious truths have been passed over by your long-striding manner of deduction. The diamond-seekers who find the most jewels are the ones who get down on their hands and knees into the mud. Your leap is a leap in the dark, while I can only walk in the light. In the light, I can see that every physical effect has a physical cause; and it is surer footing to believe that this continues the case endlessly, than that it is arbitrarily interfered with at some unknown and unreachable point by an unscientific mystery, by an eternal contradiction." Prof. Flint's effort, excellent as it is in certain qualities, fails—as all like efforts have failed—because of the inadequacy of the method. And, since this is the only method that has been tried in our later English Apologetics, they have never produced any thing better than the special pleading of probability, the vain Babel-building of considerations—cumulative proof, as it is called—whose end is our present confusion of tongues.

If we are not to look upon God as a thing, why should we look for him in a category of things? Yet it is there that the author, who in the early lectures laments such procedure, is found until nearly the end, when he indicates that there is another path which he might have pursued, though with less easy and inviting travel, and doubtless with a smaller company. When will our theologians find out that that other is the *only* path of demonstration? that their reflections about First Cause, Universal Substance, Supreme Being, and Biggest Thing of Things are subjective and formal, satisfactory to no minds but those whose simple faith they strengthen because they appear to establish what they themselves had first disturbed—anointing wounds of their own infliction? Popular proofs, if defective, may be harmful in proportion to their popularity. Better dogmatism outright than weak argument, that brings truth into disrespect.

The task which Prof. Flint has undertaken, and so admirably half-done, remains to be finished. The completion will wait for other tools than those of English, or Scotch, or even of Kantian philosophy. They will be furnished by a logic which not only thinks in categories, but thinks through them; which sees how one category negatives itself into another that is more concrete; how the effect causes the cause to be a cause, as much as the cause makes the effect to be an effect; how, instead of dependence leaning backward only, it leans forward also, and thus props and sustains itself in *Reciprocity* as the union of parts which have no being except in their union as an organic Whole; how the Whole, because it is the Whole, and has nothing outside of it to determine or cause it, must cause or determine itself, and therefore be free—creative—its own aim and the aim of all things which it creates; not substance, merely, but subject; self-conscious, and accordingly conscious of a self, which likewise is conscious of a self that in its turn is conscious of a similar self; and so on, throughout endless generations of rational selves. That logic is the logic of Hegel. Prof. Flint, in the appendix to his lectures, refers to Hegel's *Beweise für das Daseyn Gottes*. He surely has not read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested it.

R. A. H.

A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM. By PHYSICUS. Published by Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

Physicus imagines that he has, by searching, found out the Almighty to perfection, and names him the Persistence of Force. Persistence of Force, we are told,

explains every mystery of matter and of mind. It bolts the categories of theology, and of metaphysics which theology has suborned. Cause and effect, substance and accident, design and will, disappear in its throat. Force is everywhere, and eternal. The apparent diversity of the world—organic, chemic, and mechanical—its many-named things and distinct agents, are the changing moods and masks, of one and the same omnipotence, which never loses a pulse of strength, and in every act remains at home with itself. It is the gravity and light of the stars, and the law of their motion. It is the growth of plants, the instinct of animals, the conscience of men. Every cubic inch of space is crowded with its presence, and has no room to spare for a rival god. Such a god, if he could get room, would have nothing to do but to loaf and look on. None of the old-fashioned arguments against Atheism apply to this new-found substitute for a divine Person. It does not work by chance, but by the necessity of its own nature. It does not make a universe as a piece of handicraft, but is the universe forever, making and unmaking itself. It does not coerce the wills of men, but constitutes them; they are one of Its modes, as heat is another. Even religious sentiment It kindly leaves as a very fine volatility of upward escape—an inner laughing-gas—to ease the hurt of Its own presence upon human life. Therefore let the absolute *It* be seated in the vacant throne of Theism.

But before we bow down to this strange Pronoun, we should like to know a little of Its nature,—to see, at least, the back parts of Its glory. Physicus has told us what It is not, rather than what It is. This description leaves It the absolute Neuter of thought. The Force that persists is not a *thing*, for things perish; nor is it any mere particular force, like electricity, for electricity, as such, passes into heat, or magnetism, or motion, and therein ceases to be electricity. In what, then, does this power, which never perishes like things, nor changes like particular forces, differ from them so as to have a positive attribute of its own, which shall at the same time include all their contradictory characteristics. If particular forces are as inadequate to define it as particular things, why call It Force, rather than Thing. Forces are only manifested in the decay of things, and distinguish themselves by vanishing one into another. But the secret might of the universe persists. Why, then, give to the abiding a name that signifies evanescence? No modifying adjective can prevent the imposture of association in such an *alias*. The stress of the definition is on Force; and popular thinking, which is careless and one-sided, will conceive the universal as one of the family of particulars whose surname it has adopted, while its Persistency will count for little more than an initial.

When Physicus tries to define this abiding totality, he will discover that, having nothing else to necessitate It, It is Its own necessity, and therefore free; that having nothing else to act on, It acts on Itself, and hence creates; that, acting as a totality on each of Its creatures, It thereby manifests Its whole nature on the creature's finitude, and so makes all change, or *progress*, from lack to fulness; that, active and passive—identical with and different from itself—in the same instant, It contains a most unphysical contradiction, the like of which is only found in self-consciousness, where the thinker is his own thought, and the thought, to be correct, must correspond to the thinker's entire energy. Then Physicus will see that in Persistent Force he had stumbled against the feet of Personality, and recognize above him a look which owns his stumbling as a prayer of ignorant worship.

R. A. H.

DIE PHANTASIE ALS GRUND PRINCIP DES WELTPROCESSSES. Von J. FROHSCHAMMER, Professor der Philosophie an der Universitaet in Muenchen. Muenchen. 1877. THEO. ACKERMANN.

The object of this work is to introduce a new principle into Philosophy, and to make an attempt to explain, by its means, the development of the universe in all its stages; a principle which makes clear at the same time cognition and Real Being and Becoming, and the Ideal and Real in Existence, and which explains the unity of this existence, as well as the multiplicity manifested therein. A principle of this kind, which suffices all requirements, and which corresponds with the facts to be explained, has not been furnished by any of the previous philosophical systems, all of which suffer from onesidedness. The spiritual and ideal phenomena or facts cannot be explained from realistic principles—that is, from material atoms or mechanically operative forces: and, *vice versa*, matter or physical force cannot be explained from idealistic principles—from spiritual, self-conscious beings. If such an explanation or derivation is attempted, it can be accomplished only by denying one of the two actual factors of the existence of the universe—be it the idealistic or realistic factor—or by causing one of them to be swallowed up, as it were, by the other. It may also be done, however, by simply asserting both to be identical, without proving the identity—as does Spinoza, and as do some modern natural science men and philosophers. The same holds good in regard to the explanation of the unity of the world, and of the multiplicity of the phenomena in the world. Those systems that maintain the unity cannot seriously establish or explain the multiplicity and diversity of the universe, as Spinoza again shows; and those, on the other hand, who maintain multiplicity and diversity are not able to explain the unity of complicated, uniform substances—at any rate, not on natural principles, but only by taking refuge in a supernatural, divine influence or agency. This is clearly shown in the case of Leibnitz, who brings unified order into his monads only by a preëstablished harmony; and is, in point of fact, also the case with Herbert. Again, if the fundamental principle is taken to be logical and rational—for instance, a Logical Idea, as Hegel takes it—we cannot understand how illogical, irrational facts are possible, the occurrence whereof are nevertheless undeniable, at least in human, spiritual life. If, on the other hand, we make the Illogical and Irrational our fundamental principle, as Schopenhauer does with his blind and unconscious will, we do not comprehend whence the Logical and Rational came—which, after all, can also not be denied altogether—and which Schopenhauer himself is compelled to admit as a fact, at least so far as his own philosophy is concerned, in so far as he regards it as true. If, finally, we assume consciousness, as Personality or the Ego, to be the fundamental principle of the universe, we find it absolutely impossible to derive the unconscious from the consciousness thereof as such; while, if we take the unconscious to be that principle, we cannot comprehend how consciousness can arise from it.

Thus the problem remains to discover, if possible, a fundamental principle which will satisfy claims of an utterly opposite nature, and be able to explain all those opposites from its own essence and peculiar nature; a principle which may be shown to be, at least factually, the source of all the multiplicity of facts—even if its own nature should remain incomprehensible—as is really always, in the end, the case in regard to every principle applied by human cognition.

This fundamental principle the author formulates as “Phantasy;” that is, he takes the fundamental principle of the world-process to be in analogy with that

peculiar faculty of the human spirit which is called Phantasy, or power of imagination, or power of representation. In this faculty and its activity we see the original character of the principle which entered into the world-process, and it itself is the subjective and liberated product of the analogous objective creative principle. Of course, Phantasy must here not be taken in the ordinary limited sense, as a faculty whereby we represent things that do not at all exist, or whereby we represent them differently from their actuality. It is true that this faculty also exhibits a chief quality of the world-principle, namely, its creative and plastic faculty; but the other qualities of Phantasy can be explained only when we consider the original significance of the word and the essence and actuality corresponding to it. Phantasy is in fact the faculty, the power, to produce appearances, — that is, to form appearances for our consciousness, or to form images in our consciousness. Now, in this activity of Phantasy it happens that all three opposites, which we spoke of above as insurmountable for the various philosophical principles, appear as cancelled, at least in a formal manner and for our consciousness. Phantasy operates idealistically, and yet at the same time (in a formal way) realistically; for it always creates in consciousness sensuous forms for spiritual contents, fixing and revealing the latter in internal images. On the other hand, sensuous images gain through Phantasy also a spiritual significance. They are spiritualized; as, for instance, in the case of symbols. Hence Phantasy connects the spiritual and the sensuous, and this connecting constitutes essentially its activity. Hence it operates, at least temporarily, for consciousness, in both a realistic and an idealistic way. Again, the opposition of unity and multiplicity is cancelled in Phantasy and its activity; since, while remaining unity, it produces a multiplicity of images or representations, and, furthermore, understand how to gather a multiplicity into a unity. It is both a creative and a synthetic faculty. It furthermore produces for consciousness, from out of unconsciousness, its images or signs, whether the incitation comes from the outward or from the inward (from the depth of the soul itself); and hence it unites the sphere of the Unconscious with that of knowledge. Furthermore, the activity of Phantasy is the ground of the rational as well as of the irrational; it makes possible the realization of logic and of the teleological, while it also contains the possibility of the irrational, arbitrary, and illogical, as exhibited mainly in childhood, before real intellectual activity is aroused. Finally, Phantasy, or the inner power of representation and imaging, is also the incessantly active element in the psychical nature of man. This is specially manifested in the abnormal state of our physical-psychical life — in sickness, dreams, narcotic conditions, etc. But in the conscious state also — nay, even when our mental activity is quite fresh, and works with clearly known intent — the images of our Phantasy obtrude themselves obstruently, cause our attention to flag, confuse us, and produce, as it were, a permanent conflict between the self-active mind and the unconsciously arising and obtrusive play of divers representations.

Now, if we should succeed in proving that the plastic power of nature, especially in its organic and living products, its plants and animals, works in a like manner and exhibits similar qualities, especially in generation, to those we discover in the Phantasy of man, which is everywhere considered the really creative power in man, we should, at least, have shown a sameness of action and occurrence. But, if it could be further shown that the activity and developing process of the plastic power of nature, or objective Phantasy, produces continually higher, more subjective individuals, and that, in this process of nature, there

occurs a steadily increasing wealth of external form and of internal significance—we should have discovered, indeed, the universal principle of the World-Process, and this principle might be best characterized as Phantasy.

To establish this is the object of the work in question. It is divided into three books, the first of which discusses Phantasy as a special subjective mental faculty, and contains mostly investigations relating to theoretical cognition. The second book shows how objective (real) Phantasy manifests itself in the process of nature and strives to subjectivate and spiritualize itself. Its contents are, therefore, of a natural science character. The third book, finally, seeks to establish how the human mind, how self-consciousness and the fundamental faculties of the mind are formed by the activity of the creative World-Phantasy.

It is impossible to enter here into the details of the investigation; we must content ourselves with a few suggestions concerning the problems treated and the manner of the solution. The investigation proceeds from the ordinary significance of the word Phantasy, and its manifestation or activity. It then shows how the fundamental activity of this peculiar mental faculty is to be found in all spiritual activity as the real motive power, the life-inspiring element, and first condition: in the Will as well as in Feeling, but especially in the faculty of cognition, from the function of the senses upward to the most abstract logical operation. The importance of the (productive) power of imagination in regard to the process of cognition, however, has been already pointed out by Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, and introduced in the very central part of that work, in order to utilize the categories and connect them with the sensuous forms of contemplation. He remarks expressly: "This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form (the transcendental producing of the power of imagination) is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, the true working of which we shall not likely ever discover from nature, or place uncovered before our eyes." In another passage, Kant calls the power of imagination a blind faculty, it is true; but he adds, expressly, that without this faculty cognition would be simply impossible. With the same, nay, a still more emphatic decidedness, J. G. Fichte states this in his Science of Knowledge. He says: "Without this wonderful faculty (the productive power of imagination), positively nothing of the human mind can be explained; and it is very probable that the whole mechanism of the human mind can be easily explained from it." It thus lay near at hand to undertake a thorough investigation of this power of imagination, or Phantasy, since Kant and Fichte had after all not done so, however much use they made of that faculty in their constructions, and emphatically recognized its importance; especially as owing to their neglect to do so it happened that, in the time after Kant and Fichte, Phantasy continued to be generally considered simply as an organ of artistic creation and enjoyment, and turned over to the science of *Æsthetics* for investigation, though also regarded with curiosity as the source of strange conditions and manifestations of human nature. In the activity of cognition there are, mainly, two moments only in which Phantasy manifests itself; we can characterize them as the *thetical* and the *synthetical* moments. The formative, as it were creative, power of the mind is needed to posit as well as to cancel, to relate as well as to negate in thinking. It is also necessary for the abstract activity of thinking in the synthetical development and combination of judgments and conceptions. If anything is to be posited or affirmed in consciousness, we need always an image or sign, which is produced by our inner power of imaging; and even in negating, the creative power of the

mind must, at least, formally manifest itself in and for consciousness; for the Nothing, the negation, must itself operate in the mind as a power in order to cancel the positive, and hence in order to produce a specific effect in consciousness. In the same way the inner power of imaging is necessary for the creation of abstract conceptions, which, as such, have no existence at all in actuality, but are formed, or rather conceived, in the mind. Again, the productive and combining power of the mind is necessary in the formation of judgments, the connecting or separating of two thought-elements; for the conceptions and their union must be produced in the mind at the same time for consciousness, and kept hold of for the sake of comparing them and forming a judgment on them. Thus Phantasy, which, to be sure, so far as it shapes things in consciousness that do not exist at all, or shapes things otherwise than as they exist, appears as the source of error, is, nevertheless, also the fundamental condition and organ of the cognition of truth, and, moreover, of logical, real, and ideal truth, all of which forms are elaborately explained in the above work, according to their nature and essence. The ground-forms of truth, and of the cognition of truth, the categories and ideas, proceed also from Phantasy, as Kant has already suggested, and form the leading points of view for the higher power of cognition.

Now, then, arises the question whether this subjective Phantasy, which is so important for the process of cognition, has an original character and principle of its own, or whether it is merely a secondary, derived function of the mind? The investigation here shows that it cannot be derived from any of the other mental faculties, the functions whereof are rather conditioned by it; but that we certainly find everywhere in objective, real nature, in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, certain effects which indicate an analogous, real, formative power, which may well be the source and cause of the analogous, subjective faculty, Phantasy. Thus arises the further problem, whether this objective plastic principle which manifests itself in nature is an original force, a fundamental principle of the process of nature, or is itself produced by other causes, be these substances or physical forces? We have thus arrived at the real fundamental problem, the question concerning the origin of the organic, of life, of sensation, of consciousness, etc., which has excited in recent times so many investigations and disputes between the men of natural science and philosophers for and against materialism, and concerning the correctness or incorrectness of Idealism and Theism. Here, also, an answer has already been suggested by Kant and Fichte, and expounded at length by Schelling and Hegel, the decision being in favor of Idealism. According to Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, time and space are not objective, but subjective forms of contemplation, the things in themselves whereof give, through their effect on us, the material contents of our cognition (experience), whilst the understanding, by means of the categories, furnishes cognition the form. Out of this arises the world of our knowledge, the world of appearances. Now, if this combination of forms of contemplation and conceptions of the understanding, and hence the only possible real cognition, is conditioned and realized by the productive power of the imagination, the world of appearances, so far as we know it, is also essentially conditioned by it. In a more emphatic way this thought appears in Fichte's Idealism. In his view the non-Ego as well as the Ego are products of the Ego; the science of Knowledge is also a science of Being. If, then, Knowledge—that is, the construction of science—is effected by means of the productive power of imagination, Being, or the non-Ego, must be effected in the same way. In Schelling we note already the objective tendency of the view of this world some-

what in his system of transcendental Idealism, and more decidedly in his Natural Philosophy and the Identity System. The formative principle in the process of nature is now real and objective, and not merely ideal and subjective. In Hegel, finally, the objective moment gains even the ascendancy, as the objective dialectic of nature and of the world. It is everything, and subjective thinking, with its formal logic, is the limited, the untrue. The productive power of imagination of Kant and Fichte is thus, to be sure, replaced by the logical idea; but this idea has a real, objective character.

But we have to deal here, not with these general thoughts and constructions, but with the question whether, in objective nature, a formative (plastic) power is necessary and effective for the production of the organic and living formations in all their gradations and kinds. This question has put itself forth in quite a definite form by the revival of materialism, that is, of the assertion that the elementary substances, or atoms, with their physical and chemical forces, suffice to produce, not only life and organisms, but also physical, and, finally, even spiritual functions.

This, of course, involves another assertion, namely, that the first organisms themselves originated through *generatio spontanea* — that is, through the material substances alone — without a special external or internal principle of formation. To refute these assertions, it was necessary to prove that neither organization generally, nor life, sensation, and consciousness can be explained merely out of material substances and mechanical forces, and that a *generatio spontanea* can be neither empirically demonstrated nor artificially produced. In fact, of late the most prominent men of natural science acknowledge, more and more generally, that at least sensation and consciousness cannot be explained from the physical and chemical qualities of the material substances, and from merely mechanical movements. They are, therefore, of opinion that we must assume a special quality in the material atoms, a faculty of sensation, which lies concealed in them, but becomes actualized and manifest when the substances are properly combined and formed. But, in granting this, natural science recognizes the assertion of a special peculiar principle, from which life, sensation, and consciousness originate, the only difference being that we represent this as a universal, original unit-principle, while the men of natural science represent it as pluralistic, and posit it in their (very problematic) material atoms.

This universal, real-effective, but, in the manner of the human Phantasy, plastically and teleologically formative principle, is thus established as the original principle, from which all organic and living formations of nature are derived, even the human mind itself, and its peculiar formative and creative faculty, Phantasy, from which the investigation took its start.

To represent this process of formation and development of the universal principle, or of the creative World-Phantasy, at least in its general features, and thus to show how the particularization of this principle, immanent in the world itself, or the concrete formations of the world, become more and more internal, psychical, and hence subjective; this is the object of the second book of the above work. In analogy with all development and all known facts of palæontology, it is to be assumed that this formative world-principle was at first itself in a condition of universality and undeterminedness, or of a certain indifference, and that it only gradually concentrated itself into concrete forms, thereby always developing itself to a higher degree. This, of course, also involved a continual withdrawing and distinguishing of itself from the material substances and the merely physically

effective power, but on no account a real separation; since we can never think the principle without force and material substrate, and hence without a real basis. At the very beginning of organic development, therefore, nature resembled already, on the whole, an organism, though an undeveloped and unarticulated organism. Its differentiation and development into the infinite fulness and multiplicity of plants and animals occurred only gradually, and not according to mere chance, or mere external relations, but under the rule of a law of formation. Hence it is the theory of descentence which lies at the basis of this work; and due recognition is also made of Darwin's theory of transmutation, although it is not held to be fully sufficient to explain the species in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, which indeed needs a teleological and ideal law for their explanation. This ideal law must at the same time be understood as a fundamental impulse, immanent in nature, by virtue of which the whole development of nature strives, not only after an infinite multiplicity of external forms, but also after an *internalizing*, through which nature seeks to get hold of itself in the individuals, to find itself in them, and to enjoy their rationality, their lawfulness, and purposefulness. This occurs, above all, in the culture and activity of the senses and the sensory nerves. Both result from the teleological and ideal impulse of nature, which is inherent in the fundamental principle as a law or rule, and are organs of rationality itself, which strives after self-perception. The senses are already in their arrangement a work and expression of the understanding. By their activity, which is not merely receptive, but really active, and as it were creative, they reveal a sphere of existence which would not be open to us otherwise; for instance, the sphere of life and color through the eyes, and that of tones through the ear. Here, then, we have already a self-perception of nature, which not only the individual sees and hears, but which nature itself reveals unto itself; since in its own immanence and unity seeing and hearing is realized. It is similar in regard to sensation. We do not derive sensation from the material atoms and their combination, but from the teleological or rational essence—from the lawfulness of nature. For sensation is conditioned by this: that in a given individual, internal, normal relations receive a change from parts or moments, which is either beneficial or harmful to that relation. This, by the by, gives rise to the feelings of satisfaction (joy) or dissatisfaction (pain), and is everywhere applicable. In a being that is wholly uniform, without any relation, sensation is impossible; since no change can take place in a being that is utterly uniform and indifferent. If we wish to ascribe sensation to material atoms, we must endow them with an articulated, rationally, or teleologically arranged internality—that is, we must represent them no longer as mere atoms, but as organic formations, in the way of Leibnitz's monads. We cannot, therefore, escape the assumption that sensibility is conditioned by teleological arrangement, which is an expression of rational and ideal lawfulness, in such a way that sensitive organisms have a feeling of what ought to be and what ought not to be; by which exposition we obtain, and have furthermore revealed to us, an ideal moment accompanying material occurrences. Sensibility and sensation itself gives us the basis of internality and of the larger part of psychical culture, which in animals manifests itself especially in their impulses and instincts, but develops even in them already into a sort of intellectual capacity, and a capacity of feeling. We cannot discuss this matter here more at length, and must refer to the exposition of the work itself. One important circumstance in the process of development, however, must be mentioned: the propagation and transmission of culture through generation. Real, objective

Phantasy, namely, or teleological plastical power of formation, manifests itself in the process of generation, by which a continuation of that which is organic and living, as well as a development and higher grade of both, is transmitted. But gradually psychical life arises out of both, and in it appears more and more, as the higher development rises, Phantasy as a subjective condition; at first still in a latent state in the instinct, but next also as a free faculty of representation; still limited, however, altogether to its own existence and life. And thus we have suggested the transition, or the potentializing, of the formation of the creative World-principle for the production of the nature of man and the spirit of man.

The third book treats of the human mind itself, and attempts to explain its origin and qualities from the action of Phantasy, as the fundamental principle of the World-Process. The first point is to explain the higher independence of the human soul, in comparison with the animal souls; and, next, self-consciousness. Both are conditioned by the psychical organism, which forms itself on the basis of physical-psychical organization, and which, to be sure, does not manifest itself in human nature all at once and unmediated, but can be found in its traces and beginnings already in the higher animal world. This psychical organism, it is true, develops itself out of the physical world as a soul by means of the *real-working* Phantasy, which becomes subjective, and finally a subject; but it grows independent—that is, capable of self-consciousness and of an independent Will—only by means of liberated and formal-working Phantasy—that is, of Phantasy in the limited sense of the word. For Phantasy, as a formative (plastic) principle, works *real* only in intimate conjunction with physical laws, and is in so far subjected to the lawfulness and necessity of nature. But gradually, and as the animating principle of the body, it grows ever more concentrated and independent; so that, even in the animals, it elevates itself, as it were, above the organism, so that it can determine the organism no longer merely through impulses (as *causæ efficientes*), but also through representations (*causæ finales*), making it in so far already capable of the application of Will and arbitrariness. But in human nature this principle, as soul, has, so to speak, a superabundance of power, which liberates man from the compulsion of natural laws, manifests itself in arbitrary activity, and operates as subjective, or subjectivistic, Phantasy. This appears clearly in the character of children, in whom the real mind is as yet altogether Phantasy, and breaks out in arbitrary plays and games, changing things as whim dictates, and in accordance to fictitious images, and paying no heed to any law of nature. The mind, having become liberated, takes a pleasure in rising above all ordinary lawful occurrences, and, disregarding the laws of nature and of logical thought, manifests itself thus in games, stories, fairy tales, etc. By this sort of play the mind strengthens itself in its independent power; and, after having absorbed considerable experience, and various kinds of spiritual food out of history, the psychical organism rises over that of the body, and the soul, gifted with consciousness, enters self-consciousness, and becomes spirit, or personality, with the Ego as its centre.

For, since consciousness has no longer the merely eternal—nature and bodily existence—for its contents, but is now based on the psychical organism, it presently arises into self-consciousness, which knows nothing of bodily functions (at least not directly), but only of psychical being and working. This psychical organism, gradually grown up, as it were, out of the physical organism, is not a simple, uniform being, but has its own inner articulation. It is a unity of faculties, that manifest themselves in various functions and activities, and which are,

therefore, designated different fundamental faculties of the mind. It has been justly deemed proper to point out three such fundamental faculties in the one (unit) spirit or mind: the faculty of feeling, the faculty of cognition, and the power of the will; for this triplicity is also found in all real things, and especially in the physical organisms. We distinguish matter as their real substrate, form as their determining law, and force as their executive power. All three moments together constitute their essence or substance—taking the latter word in the Aristotelian sense, as an individual being, composed of matter and form. Thus, the mind, in spite of the unity of its essence, embraces a multiplicity of moments or forces, which, far from endangering its real unity, actually condition it; for the merely in itself uniform constitutes only a mass, but not a true unity.

We have not time here to enter at length on the genesis and modes of activity of the separate spiritual faculties, and must, therefore, refer to the work itself, wherein they are elaborately set forth—feeling, especially, being treated very fully. So far as the faculty of cognition is concerned, a definite distinction is made between the understanding and reason: the former representing the *logical* power of the mind—the faculty of forming judgments, conceptions, and conclusions—and the latter the faculty of feeling and cognizing *ideal* truth. Both faculties are explained, not merely in regard to their nature and contents, but are, in accordance with modern requirements, developed in their genesis and growth; since they, also, surely do not spring suddenly into existence without mediation. They, also, are determined in their genesis, as well as in their functions, by the plastic power of Phantasy. The understanding arises, to state the matter in a few words, through the union—marriage, as it were—of Phantasy with the universal laws and forms of Being, from which the laws and the universal forms of thinking, and hence the laws of logic and the categories, arise in the spiritual subject. In a similar way, Reason is genetically constructed by the union of Phantasy and the Ideas. For the ideas, like the universal laws, have not arisen suddenly into existence; they lie concealed in the depths of existence as eternal truths, and are only shaped and revealed by Phantasy. They are thus existent in the human soul, primarily, as capacities or faculties, or as germs that spring into activity and development only by means of a corresponding influence. The Ideas express an eternal being—truth, beauty, the good, etc. They have not been arbitrarily elaborated, or adopted through habit, use, common agreement, or force, in a manner as if they could just as well be otherwise than they are; but they express something necessitated in its being, as well as in its essence—something which cannot not be, and which cannot be otherwise than it is. So far as the Will is concerned, it is true that in the great World-Process it develops itself from the physical-psychical organization, and especially from the impulse; but the power working by means of it receives in the psychical organism, through the free element of Phantasy, a basis for self-determination, or independent decision. It can thus not only determine itself by representations, and arise above mere impulses and instincts like the animals, but is able to give unto itself its self-determination from the depths of its own essence; that is, it can determine itself from out of the psychical organism, and the central point thereof—the Ego. But this sort of freedom is also not something that has suddenly, and without mediation, arisen in the human mind; it likewise, only in a much more imperfect degree, pervades all nature. For the World-Phantasy conceals an element of freedom which, in conjunction with the lawfulness of nature, produces its infinite multiplicity and its most remarkable forms.

These are the main contents of the above work, in brief outline. At its close appears, however, an investigation into the relation of Phantasy to some abnormal conditions of human nature, dreams, somnambulism, spiritism, and diseases of the mind. On this we cannot dwell any longer; but, in conclusion, would meet an objection that may be raised against the main argument of the book. The mind, it will be noticed, is represented as the creature, or product, of the World-Phantasy—nay, as part thereof, since itself has entered the World-Process in a way, and no longer stands above it; and yet this same mind, which has been formed in its Essence by Phantasy, in conjunction with the laws of nature, is again endowed with Phantasy as its special faculty. How, then, can the mind distinguish itself from its special faculty? In the same manner in which the bodily organism, which is a product of the power of generation, is distinguished from that Power which the organism itself possesses, and manifests in new generations. Thus, the mind is the product of Phantasy as the World-Principle, but possesses at the same time Phantasy as a mental power of production. In fact, all creations of the human mind are possible only through the activity of subjective Phantasy; and human history, with all its great spiritual achievements and advances in language, religion, art, morals, etc., is essentially conditioned by it—a matter which the author promises to develop in a future work on the same subject.

[The foregoing notice of the remarkable work of Dr. Frohschammer was furnished, at our request, by a friend of the system residing in Germany, and translated by Mr. Kroegeer. It is, one will perceive, the polar-opposite of the system of Schopenhauer. While the latter makes Will to be the fundamental principle of the world, and sets up the doctrine that *Vorstellung* (which includes the intellectual activities, and might be called Phantasy, as in this book) is a derivative faculty, created by will for a specific end. On the contrary, Dr. Frohschammer makes Phantasy the fundamental principle, and the evolver of all else. Schopenhauer's system, founded on the Will alone, ends in Pessimism; and so every system that lays great stress on the Will is like to do. Even Calvinism contain elements of pessimism, because it emphasizes the Will and human responsibility. The doctrine of eternal punishment—of endless hell—is a figurative expression of Will utterly free—so that all its deeds return wholly to itself (without the interposition of grace, without the interposition of the mediation of human society, or the human race, between the individual and his deed).

Dr. Frohschammer's theory, it would seem from this, ought to be optimistic. For its application, we shall await with interest the appearance of his promised new work on the subject.—EDITOR.]

THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND COGNATE THEMES IN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. By L. D. McCabe, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Ohio Wesleyan University. Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Welden. 1878.

The position of the author as briefly stated by Dr. Hurst, who writes the introduction to this book, is: "That universal prescience is incompatible with human freedom; that there can be no tenable system of theology, or of moral philosophy, based upon that doctrine; but that the whole Christian system may be made consistent, defensible, and satisfactory by the denial of it; and that all the doctrines and prophecies of Scripture are plainly reconcilable with such denial."

"The important distinction," says Dr. McCabe (chapter XXI), "between the action of a free will and the movement of a material force is, that every event in the domain of the latter has a necessary antecedent, whereas a volition has really

no antecedent. It has precedents, but those precedents involve nothing coercive, or necessary, or uniform. There is in them nothing that can indicate with certainty a particular choice; nothing that can afford omniscience any certainty as to the future production of that volition, of which there are, and can be, nothing more than the occasions.

"The moment we admit that the precedent of a volition is of such a nature as to afford omniscience ground for absolute certainty as to that volition, that moment we annihilate, to all human discrimination, the distinction between freedom and the great law of cause and effect, and we introduce confusion into our thinkings; that instant we logically destroy human freedom, accountability, and the possibility of a divine moral government. True, the human will requires reasons, motives, considerations, and even temptations, as the occasions of its rewardable exercise. But these are always numerous, various, and uncoercive. There can be nothing coercive in the character of the precedents of those choices which entail endless destiny, if a man is a free agent." "Between the antecedent of an effect and an occasion of a volition there is, and there can be, therefore, no element of resemblance or oneness."

The difficulty, it will be noticed, which leads to the denial of foreknowledge lies in the assumption that causality is the supreme condition of what is foreknown; hence it is inferred that the products of a free activity transcend the sphere of foreknowledge. If one replies: "God sees the act as free, but he sees it in and by and through that particular influence that is finally the occasion of the choice and of the volition," Dr. M'Cabe answers: "If a foreknowledge of a volition is obtained through perceiving the final desirability which will, in fact, prove to be the occasion of that volition, this does not in the least relieve the great difficulty. We do not, and we cannot, remove volition from the category of the action of cause and effect. In so doing we remove the cause of the determination of the will from the subjective to the objective, and then from the objective we estimate the movement of the subjective."

Every human being, according to this doctrine,—

* * * "Contains

A something that defies precalculation,
Exhausts all motives known to sense and reason,
All likelihoods, all probability,
And in the event disables the conclusion;
For Reason, though it placed the stake correctly.
'Tis Madness casts the die. There is not space
In the wide universe of amplitude
Sufficient to swing the balance, wherein
To weigh the sequence of one puny act."

Still another view might be presented:—

If we consider for a moment the conditions under which prediction, or foreknowledge is possible, do we not find two very different grounds?

A knowledge of the totality of conditions which determine the being of any somewhat that is under fate or necessity — *i.e.*, is externally constrained — will give us a knowledge of its future. A knowledge of the objects and aims of a free being, combined with a knowledge of the means or instrumentalities that he has to work with, gives us sufficient ground to foreknow what he will do; and the more free the being, both in purpose and instrumentalities, the more certain is our foreknowledge of his course of action. The less his degree of insight, and the

more capricious his purposes — so much the less possible is it to predict his action on the grounds of freedom. But, on the contrary, it becomes easier to predict his career from external circumstances; for, just in proportion to the lack of insight and the dominance of caprice in a being, the same is under the control of external circumstances.

Just because God is perfect Insight and perfect Will, and uses perfect instrumentalities to realize a perfect purpose — it is possible for us to foreknow his action, in proportion as we ourselves grow in ability to penetrate the universal and necessary nature of perfect knowledge and will, and the final cause of the world. We are able to be most certain about God's action, because he is perfectly free. His actions, being partly free, and partly controlled by outside fate for the reason of man's imperfect insight and imperfect will, are to be foretold partly on grounds of freedom and partly on grounds of fate, or natural laws of cause and effect. Causality is the law of external constraint — that of nature and fate. *Final cause*, or teleology, is the law of freedom. Causality appertains to the relation of dependence on others; final cause to independence and self-determination.

That the law of final cause transcends the law of cause, and is its logical condition, is the great insight of Aristotle, and the true basis of all spiritual explanations of the universe.

God's knowledge being perfect, both as to the subsidiary laws of causality as the world of mere nature, and also as to the transcendental laws of freedom and self-determination, is equal to perfect foreknowledge of necessitated events, of free events, and of events that partake partly of one and partly of the other category.

However this may be, we may thank Dr. McCabe, in behalf of the theological public, for his candid discussion and clear statement of the issues involved in the question.

SYMMETRICAL EDUCATION OR THE IMPORTANCE OF JUST PROPORTION IN MIND AND BODY. By W. Cave Thomas. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1873.

Contents: Chapter I. — General argument in favor of a proportionate or symmetrical development, and against the common practice of cultivating individual bias, *i. e.*, disproportion. The vulgar error refuted that intellectual power is in proportion to the number of subjects acquired, or that quantity is of greater importance than quality. Chapter II. — The modifiability of human nature renders its symmetrical development or rectification possible. Chapter III. — The transfer of power from one part of the system to another. A balanced or equitable distribution of power amongst the faculties to be aimed at. Chapter IV. — The right constitution of the preparatory or educational setting-up schools of the kingdom. With *addenda* on technical education.